United States Military Institutions on the African Continent: A Positive Force or a Catalyst for Conflict?

19 December 2018
By Jacob Sharp

United States interests in the African continent, and more specifically military interests have historically been either minimal or nonexistent. With the 9/11 terror attacks this stance changed quite radically, eventually seeing the creation of a complete military command in 2008 under President George W. Bush dedicated solely to African operations. This command, known as AFRICOM, promised to take a slightly different road than other region-specific commands, hoping to balance hard military power and objectives with soft power goals.

Overall as per their own mission statement, the goals of AFRICOM are to enhance defense capabilities and deter threats while simultaneously promoting “regional security, stability, and prosperity”. While these intentions are obviously very positive and seemingly provide a mixture of hard and soft power goals, AFRICOM is not without its critics, both within the United States and spread about the African continent. The question arises, what impact does United States military intervention (specifically under the guise of AFRICOM) play on the African continent? Does the existence of AFRICOM promote stability and peace, or rather invite conflict and serve wholly selfish United States interests, which in turn opposes its very purpose of existence? This analysis will examine both pro and anti-AFRICOM stances, and in turn present possible policy prescriptions which would achieve a balanced approach to promoting African stability.

 

 

Examining the Literature

The literature examined in regards to the success and merit of maintaining AFRICOM in its current state is typically represented in two major broad-stroke debates, those being simply “pro” and “anti” AFRICOM. Within these larger schisms can be found recurring thematic elements which we will break down and explore further in the appropriate sections. Major disagreements between pro and anti-AFRICOM authors revolve most commonly around the overall intentions of the command, with some viewing the organization as genuine in its efforts towards continental stability, and others seeking to discredit its goals and actions by pointing towards U.S.-centric policies which put local populations at risk.

Making a Case for AFRICOM

As mentioned, the United States Africa Command, (henceforth simply AFRICOM), was founded under President George W. Bush in 2008 in order to specifically oversee tailored United States military goals on the African continent which had previously been lumped into another command entirely. As addressed by Blanchard, AFRICOM is structured as a “Combatant Command ‘Plus’”, which maintains traditional military capabilities which other geographically based commands would have, but additionally incorporates a variety of stability focused soft power goals and is accompanied by a much larger civilian component than other commands.[1] This unique structure allows AFRICOM to, at least in theory, address a broader range of issues across the continent, hoping to stem potential threats before they occur by building effective security forces and facilitating other stability-focused initiatives.

Further setting the organization apart is its metric of success, with one Department of Defense official noting that AFRICOM would prove its utility “…if it keeps American troops out of Africa for the next 50 years.”.[2] While this goal is admirable, the specifics are what counts. By referencing the literature and making a few inferences, the proponents of AFRICOM view the organization as being beneficial in four main categories which we will further explore. These four categories generally consist of:

 

  • Countering rising Chinese expansion of influence.
  • Counter-terrorism efforts against a variety of organizations, Islamic and otherwise.
  • Providing a more-trustworthy alternative to often-mistrusted multilateral peacekeeping forces.
  • Providing a “training ground” for the utilization of soft power integration in a quasi-military setting, which can then be exported to other battlefields and conflicts across the world, (increasing U.S. readiness).

 

Chinese expansion within the African continent is a growing concern for Western governments, as their rising power within the region seemingly threatens the current global order. As China’s economic power grows, so has its need for raw materials.[3] This need in turn, coupled with a desire for outside investment in often-struggling local African governments has prompted a new Sino-African relationship which is ever-growing.[4] It is generally accepted, (and openly voiced by Xi Jinping), that China seeks to offer a “Beijing Consensus” or alternative framework for developing nations, free of many Western misgivings and in many cases Western judgements which might otherwise prevent assistance to the nation in question.[5]

China has perpetually showed interest in aiding nations which would otherwise be completely shunned by Western powers for one reason or another, providing them with aid packages, investment, and military cooperation.[6] If we assume that the nations in question were previously shunned for any manner of grievous misdeeds, (in many cases human rights abuses), than it can be inferred that further supporting these governments with monetary and military aid will simply encourage the governments to shy away from any meaningful reform, providing no tangible motivation to reduce or eliminate their current behavior and thus threatening both their own citizens as well as neighboring nations. Chinese support of Robert Mugabe is a shining example of this, with Chinese firms building infrastructure and cornering diamond mines and their associated revenues, often at the cost of local lives.[7]

While aiding questionable governments alone might not raise many eyebrows given our own track record of the same, this aid becomes more ominous to U.S. planners when framed in the context of China being a “strategic rival”. Within the United States government, the Chinese threat against U.S. hegemony is very real. A variety of National Security Strategy documents have been produced which quite clearly set the stage, calling for a “closer alliance between the EU and the USA” in regards to forming a multilateral opposition to the growing power of China, and Pentagon planning has made no major changes when assessing China as a military threat, with full spectrum military dominance being a primary goal.[8] While Campbell’s own reference point at the time of writing is now nearly ten years old, not much has changed in regards to the consideration of China as a major military threat. To support this, a recent Pentagon report claiming that Chinese forces have expanded their bombing capabilities with a high likelihood of actively training to strike potential U.S. and allied targets, adds significantly to the level of apprehension in regards to an expanding Chinese footprint within the African continent.[9]

In addition to seemingly propping up regimes and generally being viewed as a potential enemy, AFRICOM has a tangible “threat” on the continent in regards to Chinese “boots on the ground”. As a rather non-traditional player, China (as well as Russia) have provided peace-keeping forces for various missions throughout the continent. In the South Sudan mission alone 1,068 troops have been fielded, which constitutes roughly a battalion-plus worth of soldiers.[10] At the risk of sounding paranoid, peace-keeping missions provide a wonderful excuse to field armed soldiers and their supporting equipment in a variety of locations. Normally this would not raise many eyebrows, but when weighed against the pile of Chinese interests in the region the newfound desire for participation in peace-keeping roles seems incongruent with past actions, and provides another source of concern for AFRICOM officers who in turn must consider balancing these forces with opposing U.S. elements. In short, AFRICOM seemingly benefits U.S. interests in Africa by providing a soft-power counter to Chinese extractive economic endeavors, and also provides an immediate military response to active Chinese elements should that unfortunate scenario ever present itself.

In contrast, unlike the statecraft-heavy countering of Chinese expansion, counter-terrorism efforts provide us with a much more visible and active justification for the creation and maintenance of AFRICOM. Due to the relatively large amount of poorly or even completely ungoverned areas, various African nations host a wide variety of terrorist groups, both Islamic and secular. Of particular interest to AFRICOM are the more illustrious groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and related offshoot cells, the Islamic State, and even Iranian backed Hizballah fighters. With the recent ambush and killing of United States Army Special Forces soldiers in Niger by IS affiliated fighters, the anti-terror efforts that previously went under-reported have now been brought to the lime light.

In examining the rise of Boko Haram, military-centric efforts to defeat the group have failed. Instead it is recommended that a blended approach be taken, utilizing both military actions as well as socio-economic measures in order to fully rob Boko Haram, (now known as the Islamic State’s West African Province, or ISWAP), of any support which it might have leveraged in its advantage.[11] The blended military and soft power approach recommended by dan Suleiman is nothing if not a direct copy of the AFRICOM mission statement, and thus a living and breathing justification for the organization’s very existence. In fact, in consulting the literature it appears that there already exists some evidence of AFRICOM’s existence actively thwarting terrorist activities. Wege argues that AFRICOM’s lily-pad methodology has effectively created a “trip wire” network across the continent, whereby terrorist organizations which previously had freedom of movement and communication now run a very real risk of planting themselves squarely on the radar of joint U.S. and local security forces.[12] If we assume that the terrorist groups themselves would have existed anyways, regardless of AFRICOM/U.S. presence, (an argument that will be addressed later), then this evidence convincingly makes the case that AFRICOM in its current form has already had at least some positive impact on reducing terrorist activities, thus inevitably impacting the overall stability and safety of the nations involved.

In addition to increasing the safety of African nations through their counter-terror operations, AFRICOM and assorted U.S. forces provide a relatively safe alternative to other, potentially far worse options in regards to keeping the peace. U.S. military actions are constantly under scrutiny from a variety of angles, including the eyes and reports of the free press within the U.S., internal affairs-esque organizations, as well as government and civilian oversight. While this of course does not completely prevent misconduct, it plays a very heavy role in at the least reducing it to an extremely low level. The same cannot be said for other multilateral peace-keeping efforts. The United Nations as an example has repeatedly come under fire for a litany of crimes committed under its watch, most abhorrently the 2014 allegations that UN peacekeepers were raping women and children in the Central African Republic, a claim that has been corroborated and repeated in other African nations who claim similar crimes from a wide range of peacekeeping nationalities.[13] This terrible situation brings to light a rather ugly justification of AFRICOM’s existence, that is AFRICOM provides a fresh  take on peacekeeping operations which is, at least thus far, unmarred by scandal or abuse, and furthermore is not the product of a traditional colonial European nation. Local-nationals who have been subject to abuses by UN peacekeepers might in theory feel more comfortable working with U.S. forces instead, or at the very least U.S. monitored and trained local security forces, a commodity that AFRICOM can provide.

Finally, we close this first position with the most selfish purpose. While some areas within AFRICOM’s area of responsibility certainly contain violent struggle, (particularly the regions afflicted by terrorist groups), a larger portion of these nations are at relative peace. This peace does not however prevent AFRICOM-based soldiers and advisors from conducting their missions in regards to increasing the operational capabilities of local security forces, as well as aiding other structural organizations. This mission-set and region requires dedicated language and cultural knowledge, as well as the capability to determine local hierarchies and navigate other governmental institutions, which in turn creates and shapes highly effective and flexible military personnel. These personnel can use their AFRICOM experience as a sort of real-world training exercise when moving forward and positively impact unconventional warfare missions elsewhere throughout their careers, creating the net result of a vastly more capable U.S. military and thus, a more effective U.S. foreign policy when military institutions are required.[14]

AFRICOM as an Unwanted Entity

In spite of the evidence in favor of AFRICOM’s presence, the organization is hardly without criticism. Opposing arguments span a fairly wide breadth of positions, ranging from simple criticisms about the direction of the organization, all the way to outright rejection of United States personnel operating on the continent. Amongst the selected readings, authors voicing opposition to AFRICOM’s existence, or simple criticism towards its tactics typically fall into four primary categories:

 

  • AFRICOM’s presence signals the arrival of the Global War on Terror to the African continent, bringing with it poor judgements, acting as a target and therefore exacerbating violence.
  • While well intentioned, AFRICOM’s heavy focus on military means create an unbalanced organization which instead of aiding the local communities will instead exist as a haven for military spending and the promulgation of “forever war”.
  • AFRICOM’s presence is simply an excuse to exploit resources and specifically oil.
  • More generally, AFRICOM’s presence threatens the sovereignty of nations involved.

 

While terrorism is oft used as one primary factor for AFRICOM’s existence, (or rather

counter-terrorism), so too could the reverse claim be made. Esterhuyse, a South African, while not making an outright claim that AFRICOM exacerbates violence certainly broaches the possibility when mentioning that AFRICOM’s very existence is viewed by Africans as the arrival of “America’s global war on terror on the African continent”.[15] This arrival creates a level of anxiety amongst African governments who fully appreciate the potential for overt and covert operations being conducted under their very noses, presumably under the guise of anti-terrorism.[16] While terrorism is certainly a threat, the arrival of U.S. military personnel, (good or not), holds a very real threat of upsetting any existing status quo which in turn can signal the escalation of violence in regions where these groups might have otherwise laid low.

Along the same lines, Ken Opalo of Al-Jazeera seems to support the theory that AFRICOM’s very existence sets the conditions for more violence. AFRICOM of course deals largely with local governments by enhancing their capabilities through soft power and military means, hoping in turn to increase overall stability. Opalo claims that in many cases this cooperation requires the U.S. to turn a blind eye to human rights violations among others, solely to fulfil selfish goals like the maintenance of Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.[17] These ugly secondary effects of a U.S. military presence provide a stark contrast to the previously listed positives, and if true work to undermine many of them. How can AFRICOM provide a “safe” alternative to U.N. peacekeepers or resource-hungry Chinese interests who ignore human rights abuses if its own actions are no different?

Not all opponents make such brazen claims against AFRICOM, however. Some believe that the organization has excellent intentions and a worthy mission, but is hampered by the very nature of military-heavy commands. In some cases, these critiques revolved around the short-sightedness of AFRICOM’s military focused operations. David Wiley, an anthropologist with an African focus, cites one specific example wherein Captain Amadou Sanogo was sent to the United States for military training sessions as a part of an AFRICOM exchange. What is significant about this particular exchange is that Captain Sanogo was also the leader of the 2012 anti-democratic coup in Mali, indicating either a lack of vetting or more probably a lack of concern.[18] This sort of exchange indicates what appears to be a level of short-sightedness, embracing the “enemies of my enemies” approach for short-term gain. This short-term gain, however, could easily back fire in the very near future, and the student of history will recall similar U.S. trained personnel becoming highly problematic in the early days of the Afghan war.

While initial and ongoing claims seek to have a balanced civilian and military approach, even the formative years of AFRICOM hinted at an imbalance. Despite early-year intentions of the Obama administration to increase the State Department presence within the region, theoretically increasing the amount of soft power able to be leveraged, they were allotted fewer than 10% of the Africa-focused subject matter experts in comparison to AFRICOM and other defense-oriented commands.[19] This initial imbalance immediately skewed AFRICOM to a military-heavy focus, and when the only tool you have is a hammer every problem starts to look like a nail. Shortly after AFRICOM’s founding on this seemingly unsure and imbalanced footing, General David Petraeus authorized a significant expansion of authority in regards to the amount of clandestine operations and unconventional warfare which could take place on the continent.[20] This expansion of authorization directly opposes many of the soft power promises which AFRICOM made and additionally opened the organization up for criticism from nations in the region who might feel as if the clandestine operations undercut their own authority. If the “Phase Zero” conflict avoidance goals of AFRICOM were genuine, would carte blanche authority for unconventional warfare be necessary? Furthermore, how must this look to the local population when the nation claiming to desire peaceful capability enhancement is instead utilizing special operations personnel in their proverbial backyard?

Accompanying these claims of imbalance are the inevitable concerns about funding. In order to support many of the limited-scale missions occurring on the continent, AFRICOM must outsource many of these functions to private contractors. This reliance on contractors, which became commonplace in Iraq and Afghanistan, potentially places the lives of civilians in the hands of non-military personnel, and absolutely places hundreds of millions of dollars in the pockets of corporations.[21] The fear exists that AFRICOM simply produces another market for the military industrial complex by inserting uniformed personnel into positions that should otherwise be filled by State Department officials or non-governmental organizations.

Moving on to another element of financial concern, we arrive at those who argue that AFRICOM exists solely as an excuse to exploit local resources. Catherine Besteman, professor of Anthropology, asserts that AFRICOM’s military aid will simply win the U.S. government the ability to directly impact the shaping of laws and policies which pertain to resource extraction, (among others subjects), by militarily propping up governments which potentially have highly questionable goals.[22] Some opponents are so bold as to claim in academic journals that the sole purpose of forming AFRICOM was a Bush-era desire to exploit African oil, using the Global War on Terror as nothing more than a convenient excuse.[23] While a claim this brash is highly skeptical, other scholars do point towards the organizations alignment with the 2007 finding of oil deposits offshore of western Ghana. These scholars indicate that the Bush administration’s initial focus pre-9/11 attacks was actually U.S. energy policy, and therefore the oil and gas shortages being experienced by the nation insured that while terrorism might have been a genuine concern, it surely acted as a convenient excuse to corner oil-producing regions as well, or at the very least guarantee their safety.[24]

Finally, it becomes clear that the overarching concern of many AFRICOM-opponents is quite simply the fear that the organization in some way violates the sovereignty of the nations in question. The methods by which AFRICOM seeks to increase stability in turn cripples intergovernmental institutions, perhaps as a simple casualty of the bureaucracy which it brings along, but also effectively coops African civil society organizations which weakens their image among the very people they seek to help.[25] This intrusion into African society and government, while potentially well received at first, acts to exemplify the inherent weakness in a national government which cannot govern its own spaces, and in turn requires an outside force to aid it. When combined with invited or even uninvited clandestine operations, the threat of predatory extractive companies lurking behind every curtain, and the violent groups which may or may not be exacerbated by AFRICOM’s very existence, it is not difficult to see how sovereignty could be at risk, nor is it difficult to ascertain why AFRICOM has so many vocal opponents.

Infrastructure-based Policy Recommendation

If we make the assumption that the proponents of AFRICOM are supporting relatively sound claims, it would certainly benefit the United States to achieve a clearer policy towards Africa moving forward. Considering both the prospective AFRICOM goals as well as the dings against the organization, it stands to reason that bringing the military and civilian factions into balance would be a fine first step, and would aid in maintaining the current status quo of limited engagement without fully committing forces to the continent. While security is certainly very important in a society where ungoverned violence is hardly uncommon, focusing more efforts into shoring up soft power civilian-centric initiatives would likely create more reliable change. In regards to counter terror, U.S. administrations have long supported the idea that collapsed states support the emergence and growth of extremist organizations.[26]

By moving money into infrastructure-building projects we could attempt to reduce the size and impact of the “ungoverned spaces” found in the nations we are aiding. U.S. military personnel could certainly be involved in these projects by providing engineering, security and other construction units to aid in the planning and execution of road-building and other efforts. By bolstering local infrastructure with joint U.S. military and local-national civilian efforts, creating roads, power grids and water centers, as well as other small sustainable industries, we can simultaneously train local forces and civilians to conduct these tasks while simultaneously putting money into civilian pockets, (bypassing potentially corrupt governments), and reducing ungoverned spaces. With local forces working alongside U.S. personnel, they can receive valuable on-the-job security and infrastructure-construction training which is highly advantageous, and prevents us from having to bring those personnel to the U.S.[27] To the local civilians, these projects would further join the far reaches of their own nations, providing power, transportation, bolstering intra-national trade routes for the distribution or selling of foodstuffs, as well as increasing internal security by making all regions infinitely more accessible to security forces. The money in the pockets of the local workers aiding in these projects would go back into the local economy, strengthening it as well as ensuring that the skills gained in the performance of these tasks can be used again in the future, hopefully boosting the economy further.

In addition to the above-mentioned positives, AFRICOM personnel would also receive benefits. The very actions of improving infrastructure and similar projects in cooperation with local-nationals is a difficult task which occurs in a variety of war-torn nations, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq. By performing these tasks in Africa, not only do we increase the capabilities and therefore stability of these nations, (AFRICOM’s goal), but we also train ourselves in best-practices when dealing with other nations, theoretically improving our performance world-wide. More selfishly, the creation and maintenance of large infrastructure projects make these nations more amiable to further U.S. involvement or investment, and pave the way for potentially lucrative foreign-investments which, if handled appropriately and not destructively to the local population or interests, can act to further set the stage for future economy improvement and hopefully driving these nations away from accepting similar Chinese offers.

Military-focused Policy Recommendation

In contrast to an infrastructure-based plan where reducing terrorism and benefitting local economies are the focus, we could instead focus entirely on thwarting or at least countering Chinese expansion into the continent. The current AFRICOM strategy is that of the “lily pad” base, wherein basic facilities all across the continent are utilized by U.S. personnel, with the ability to expand if needed.[28] This tactic maintains the primary AFRICOM headquarters base in Stuttgart, Germany, and prevents mitigates much of the apprehension that having a permanent settlement on the continent itself (outside of Lemonier, of course), can cause.

Should countering Chinese expansion be the goal, an option would be to fully embrace our own military power within Africa. By foregoing the lily pad tactic and instead offering lucrative benefits to local governments in exchange for a permanent military presence, we could replace many of these lily pads with a small number of much larger, much more established permanent bases. These larger bases would serve a variety of purposes, and have a number of secondary and tertiary benefits. Primarily, these bases provide a permanent and sizable military presence in their respective nations. This military presence can be used for the traditional AFRICOM nation-building mission, increasing the security and stability of the region, Simultaneously, hosting permanent forces in established bases provides a very real counter to similar Chinese expeditionary measures, preemptively staging personnel near Chinese-controlled areas in an effort to mitigate or balance their own power.

Furthermore, permanent bases bring with them certain advantages, such as the ability to construct large runways and other projects which in turn provide us the ability to more adequately and reliably use these nations for the movement and staging of our own troops in other areas. The establishment of permanent bases also requires a certain amount of local infrastructure to maintain, and the construction of this infrastructure would be inevitably shouldered by the U.S. taxpayer, providing the secondary effect of strengthening the local economy of whatever specific location it ends up being constructed in. Bases also provide jobs for local-nationals, which in turn provides an increase in employment and pushes money into the economy. The primary con with this tactic is that in comparison with a solely infrastructure-based plan, the infrastructure and economic benefits would be highly localized, likely in areas which are already urban, government controlled, and in a better economic position than the less-governed and maintained areas that could be targeted with the opposite tactic.

Conclusion

AFRICOM and other forms of U.S. military intervention within the African continent will never be without complications. The situation Africa presents to U.S. military and State Department planners is one which does not appear anywhere else in the world, and comes with its own very unique challenges. While the organization certainly has its positive and negative traits which we hopefully fully explored throughout this analysis, the key takeaway should be that local civilians should always be the primary focus. U.S. interests are certainly important, but allowing ourselves to turn a blind eye towards unsavory characters solely for self-serving purposes ultimately negatively effects regional stability, which in turn creates an environment where our own opponents prosper.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Chapter Title: DIB Best Practices and Their Relevance to U.S. Strategic Objectives in Africa

Chapter Title: Identifying and Leveraging Key Security Force Assistance Insights

 

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[1] Lauren Ploch Blanchard. “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa.” Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007. 4.

[2] Blanchard, 6.

[3]A. Carl Levan. “The Political Economy of African Responses to the U.S. Africa Command.” Africa Today 57, no. 1 (Fall 2010): 2-23. Accessed December 6, 2018. doi:10.2979/aft.2010.57.1.2. 8.

[4] Anna Samson. “The Grand Weiqi Board Reconsidering China’s Role in Africa.” Security Challenges7, no. 1 (Autumn 2011): 61-78. Accessed December 5, 2018. JSTOR. 61.

[5] Samson, 75.

[6] Samson, 75.

[7] Robert Rotberg. “Zimbabwe: What Next? Anticipating An Uncertain Future.” Harvard International Review 35, no. 3 (Winter 2014): 18-21. Accessed December 5, 2018. JSTOR. 19.

[8] Horace Campbell. “China in Africa: Challenging US Global Hegemony.” Third World Quarterly29, no. 1 (2008): 89-105. doi:10.1080/01436590701726517. 96.

 

[9] Idrees Ali. “Pentagon Says China Military ‘likely Training for Strikes’ on U.S….” Reuters. August 17, 2018. Accessed December 06, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-pentagon/pentagon-says-china-military-likely-training-for-strikes-on-u-s-targets-idUSKBN1L12MC.

[10] Elor Nkereuwem. “Nontraditional Actors: China and Russia in African Peace Operations.” Protecting Civilians in Conflict: Policy Brief, March 2017, 5-36. 25.

 

[11]Muhammad L dan Suleiman. “Countering Boko Haram.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, no. 8 (September 2015): 22-27. Accessed December 5, 2018. JSTOR. 24.

[12] Carl A. Wege. “Hizballah in Africa.” Terrorism Research Institute6, no. 3 (August 2012): 45-56. Accessed December 5, 2018. JSTOR. 45.

 

[13] Christian Locka and Jabeen Bhatti. “U.N. Fails to Stem Rapes by Peacekeepers in Africa, Victims Cry.” USA Today. January 16, 2018. Accessed December 05, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/01/16/u-n-fails-stem-rapes-peacekeepers-africa-victims-cry/1016223001/.

 

[14] Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Jan Osburg. Leveraging Observations of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan for Global Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013.

Chapter Title: Identifying and Leveraging Key Security Force Assistance Insights. 15.

 

[15] Abel Esterhuyse. “The Iraqization of Africa? Looking at AFRICOM from a South African Perspective.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 1, 2008, pp. 111–130. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26267527. 116.

[16] Essterhuyse, 116.

[17]Ken Opalo. “OPINION: The Consequences of the U.S. War on Terrorism in Africa.” Al Jazeera America. Accessed December 06, 2018. http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/6/africom-u-s-war-onterrorisminafricaalshabaabbokoharam.html

[18] David Wiley. “Militarizing Africa and African Studies and the U.S. Africanist Response.” African Studies Review 55, no. 02 (2012): 147-61. doi:10.1353/arw.2012.0041. 155.

 

[19] David Wiley. “Superb Intentions and U.S. Policy Constraints.” African Studies Review 53, no. 02 (2010): 16-21. Accessed December 6, 2018. doi:10.1353/arw.2010.0012. 19.

[20] Wiley, “Intentions”, 20.

[21] Sean Mcfate. “Briefing: US Africa Command: Next Step or Next Stumble?” African Affairs 107, no. 426 (January 2008): 111-20. Accessed December 6, 2018. JSTOR.

[22] Catherine Besteman. “‘Beware of Those Bearing Gifts’: An Anthropologist’s View of Africom.” Anthropology Today 24, no. 5 (October 2008): 20-21. Accessed December 6, 2018. JSTOR. 20.

[23] Jeremy Keenan. “US Militarization in Africa:What Anthropologists Should Know About AFRICOM.” Anthropology Today 24, no. 5 (October 2008): 16-20. Accessed December 6, 2018. JSTOR.

[24] Tom C. Mccaskie. “The United States, Ghana, and Oil.” The Ghana Reader 107, no. 428 (July 2008): 313-32. doi:10.1215/9780822374961-091. 315.

[25] Mvuselelo Ngcoya. “The Great Continental Divide: US-Africa Relations.” Review of African Political Economy 34, no. 114 (December 2007): 713-14. Accessed December 6, 2018. JSTOR.

 

[26] Nicolas Van De Walle. “US Policy Towards Africa: The Bush Administration and the Obama Administration.” African Affairs 109, no. 434 (January 2010): 1-21. Accessed December 8, 2018. doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim260100179. 8.

[27] Payne, Leslie Adrienne., and Jan Osburg. Leveraging Observations of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan for Global Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013.

Chapter Title: DIB Best Practices and Their Relevance to U.S. Strategic Objectives in Africa. 17.

 

[28] Dave Clemente. “America’s African Command: Soft Power Warriors.” The Royal Institute of International Affairs 67, no. 1 (January 2011): 22-24. Accessed December 8, 2018. JSTOR. 23.

 

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